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Namibia is the most arid country in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Windhoek, the capital
city, accelerated population growth and expanding economic activities, coupled with
highly variable rainfall and multiyear droughts, have jeopardized water security and
put enormous stress on socioeconomic development. This paper offers a review of
the 2015–2017 drought and the responses that were implemented during it, with a
focus on engagement with the public, industries, and public institutions to achieve
water-saving targets. It also considers how the use of the Windhoek Drought Response
Plan during the 2015–2017 drought furthered preparedness efforts for future droughts.
The assessment ends with a discussion of government responses, challenges faced, and
lessons learned—lessons that can hopefully pave the way for more effective responses
to future drought situations in the country.
Keywords: Windhoek, Namibia, drought management, climate change, institutional responses, residential water
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INTRODUCTION
The scale of threat to populations throughout the world is on an upward trajectory, as
climate variability and extreme weather events increase in both magnitude and frequency
(Inter-governmental Panel in Climate Change, 2014). Climate change is projected to reduce
renewable surface water and groundwater resources significantly in most dry subtropical regions
(intensifying competition among sectors) and increase them at high latitudes (Jiménez Cisneros
et al., 2014). These natural stressors, superimposed on existing socioeconomic conditions, will
ultimately have adverse impacts on the availability of water resources, food production, energy
generation, the environment, and overall incomes and livelihoods all over the world (Water and
Climate Change, 2019).
Globally, in 2019, droughts severely affected areas in northeastern China, North Korea, North
Ontario (Canada), large parts of Europe, Southern Australia, Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia,
South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Current projections indicate that severity of droughts in Southern
Africa may increase in both frequency and duration, exacerbating climate-related risks such as
overall water and food insecurity in the region (World Bank, 2012; Niang et al., 2014; Funk et al.,
2016). Of great concern is that the region supports a great many people, two-thirds of whom are
in situations in which endemic water scarcity can be expected (Water and Climate Change, 2019).
Yuan et al. (2016) illustrates that, like in other parts of the world, there is a substantial increase
in concurrent droughts and heat waves in Southern Africa. The 2015–2016 flash drought (droughts
with a rapid onset and short duration but with high intensity and devastating impacts) that affected
the region was characterized by severe heat waves and soil moisture deficit, the highest since 1948.
Flash droughts have increased by 220% from 1961 to 2016, and they are likely to further increase in
the future (Yuan et al., 2016).
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Regarding the following 2019 drought in the region,
NASA Earth Observatory (2019) considers it to have been
unprecedented. The combination of reduced and late rainfall and
long-term increases in temperature threatened the water, food,
and energy supplies of millions of people.
In the case of South Africa, the recent Cape Town drought was
estimated to have been a 1-in-590-year event (based on historical
rainfall records) whose impacts on the people and the economy
were exacerbated by poor planning andmanagement of the event
(City of Cape Town, 2019).
In the African context, in Namibia, water has always been
a scarce resource (Niang et al., 2014; Scott et al., 2018). With
frequent dry periods lasting for as long as 4 years, Windhoek, in
particular, has had an uphill battle when it comes to water supply.
Being not only the nation’s capital city but also its largest city,
Windhoek supports most of the country’s economic activities.
Figure 1 illustrates the high variability in rainfall and runoff
to the Windhoek supply reservoirs and highlights the most
challenging recent droughts, among them those of 1980–1982,
1994–1996, and 2015–2017.
Leading into the drought of 2015–2017, the 2012–2013 rainy
season brought exceptionally low and erratic rainfall, resulting
in zero inflow into the Von Bach reservoir, the primary source
of supply to Windhoek (Institute for Public Policy Research,
FIGURE 1 | High variability in rainfall and runoff to the Windhoek supply reservoirs, with challenging droughts highlighted. Source: Historical assessment of water
resource management and development in Windhoek and the Central Area of Namibia (Bruce and Burger, 2019).
2017), for the first time since the reservoir was built in 1970. This
also resulted in a presidential declaration of state of emergency
(Haeseler, 2013). Rainfall in 2014 was again highly variable and
unpredictable, leading to a prolonged period of drought from
2015 to early 2017 (Scott et al., 2018). Looking back at the data,
it is clear that the drought really started with the poor rain and
runoff in 2012/2013, yet the effects only became fully visible about
2 years later, when supplies were running dangerously low due to
the continuous below average precipitation. Most recently, 2019
saw the lowest recorded rainfall in Windhoek since 1891 and the
worst in the last 90 years in Namibia (Shikangalah, 2020).
Through the rapid implementation of targeted drought
management interventions, Windhoek thankfully managed to
survive this critical period. Without a doubt, this achievement
points to some success in the measures employed. However, the
narrative also reveals missed opportunities, shows the limited
effectiveness of certain initiatives, and illustrates how responses
to drought by governments (in this region specifically but also
perhaps throughout the world) tend to be reactive, focusing on
crisis management rather than a critical level of preparedness
(Wilhite et al., 2014).
Reflecting on the key lessons of the 2015–2017 Windhoek
drought enables an assessment of policies that can facilitate the
implementation of drought preparedness to increase adaptive
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capacity and resilience of water resources management under
similar conditions particularly in a region affected adversely by
poor governance and planning (Engle, 2013).
With this objective in mind, this paper presents a perspective
of the drought response strategies implemented by the City
of Windhoek (CoW) and the engagement with domestic and
industrial users. This article argues that without long-term
communication on the importance of prudent water usage, the
motivation to save water during dry periods is unlikely to have
the desired response, or at least not for the initial period when
this may be required. Next, the article draws on the CoW’s
experiences in engaging with industries and public institutions to
encourage multistakeholder support in complying with drought-
response strategies. Experience shows that there can be real
difficulties in obtaining support from certain business sectors,
with the city administration facing challenges in balancing the
economic needs of the various stakeholders while ensuring a
sustainable water supply. Finally, challenges and lessons learned
are discussed.
BACKGROUND SETTING
Overview of Drought Management in
Namibia
Droughts are naturally occurring phenomena in all climates, with
characteristics that vary among regions (Food and Agriculture
Organization, 2015). They have a complex series of impacts that
differ in reach and intensity but often include numerous chain
effects that affect all sectors of society either directly or indirectly
(Grigg, 2014).
In Namibia, droughts are frequent and thus require well-
prepared frameworks to guide timely responses, the most
appropriate decisions, and the management of water demand,
as necessary. In 1995, the National Drought Task Force
was established, and in 1997, the National Drought Policy
and Strategy, a long-term drought management plan, was
released following a 2-year series of workshops. The document
attempted to address the shortcomings of previous drought relief
programs and put forward several policy objectives for drought
management. A stricter definition of drought was developed
according to scientific criteria to estimate both extent and severity
of droughts, moving away from what were considered conditions
of normal aridity and an emphasis on “disaster drought.”
Future drought relief was to be based on programs and action
plans, which would be funded by the National Drought Fund.
These included programs for water supply, food security, health,
livestock, and crops (FAO/AGRIS, 1997).
The document later guided the National Climate Change
Strategies and Action Plan of 2013. This document in turn
was designed to facilitate building adaptive capacity to increase
resilience and enhance mitigation (Ministry of Environment
and Tourism, 2015). Regarding water resources, the document
acknowledges that water scarcity is already a challenge in
Namibia and that, historically, it has been a limiting factor for
socioeconomic development, a situation that is likely to worsen
with climate change.
According to the National Climate Change Strategies and
Action Plan of 2013, future features of the water sector in
Namibia may include prolonged and more severe droughts and
floods, declining soil moisture and increased evapotranspiration,
low groundwater recharge, and decreased water availability in
both quantity and quality. Proposed strategies to counteract these
impacts comprise the following: improving the understanding of
climate change and related policy responses; using monitoring
and data-collecting technologies for surface and groundwater at
the basin/watershed level; harvesting and capturing more water
during the rainy seasons; promoting more efficient water use in
all sectors; improving access to sanitation and safe drinking water
for all, particularly in flood-prone areas; promoting conservation
and sustainable utilization of water resources; improving
transboundary cooperation on water resources; and supporting
institutional and human capacity building in integrated water
resources management and use.
At the local-government level, and dealing directly with
the consequences of the drought, the CoW Department of
Infrastructure, Water and Technical Services developed a
Drought Response Plan in 2015 (City of Windhoek, 2015) and
broader Water Management Plans in 2017 and 2019 (City of
Windhoek, 2017a, 2019)1. All these plans provide guidelines on
managing water supply and use during drought events, taking
the water available in the three reservoirs that primarily supply
water to the city as an accurate indicator of the drought’s
impact on supply. The documents also define drought severity
indicators that will be used to choose responses and program
elements (City of Windhoek, 2015, p. 3). Responses are intended
to increase water supply, reduce water demand, establish water
scarcity tariffs, minimize adverse financial effects, implement
extensive public information and media relations programs,
and/or provide integrated development planning.
The next section provides details on Windhoek’s continuous
efforts to supply water to its growing population and industrial
sector. We then review the 2015–2017 drought and the
drought response actions, and focus on public engagement and
cooperation with industries and public institutions to achieve
water-saving targets.
City of Windhoek
Despite its challenging environment and the poverty of a large
portion of its population, the CoW has been a forerunner in
water resource management, constantly developing solutions for
transitioning to more adaptive systems (Lafforgue and Lenouvel,
2015). The lack of perennial rivers within Namibia means
that most of Windhoek’s water needs are met by the “three-
dam system” of the Von Bach, Swakoppoort, and Omatako
dams, which are 70, 90, and 160 km from the city, respectively
(Lafforgue, 2016; Murray et al., 2018; Scott et al., 2018). This
system supports the NamWater supply scheme for the Central
Areas of Namibia (CAN), including Windhoek. NamWater
(Namibia Water Corporation Ltd) is the national water agency
1The department is responsible for the supply, distribution, and quality of potable
water in the urban area.
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FIGURE 2 | Layout of the bulk water supply infrastructure in the Central Area of Namibia (Bruce and Burger, 2019).
that owns, operates, and maintains this potable water supply
scheme (Figure 2).
Under average meteorological conditions, water from the
three-dam system supplies 70–75% of the city’s water. The rest
(20–25%) is mostly reclaimed water, with groundwater used on a
sustainable basis (5% or less).
By the end of the 1990’s, following an extreme dry period and
as the urban population continued to grow after independence,
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the CoW again looked at ways to supplement its water
supply (Lafforgue, 2016). The alternatives discussed included
pumping groundwater from the Karst Aquifer (490 km away)
and transferring water from the Okavango River (730 km away).
Finally, the managed aquifer recharge scheme in the southern
extremities of Windhoek was identified as the most cost-effective
option, as it could store up to 33Mm3 of water, and even 60Mm3
when deep aquifers are included (Lafforgue, 2016; Murray et al.,
2018). Under this scheme, surplus water from higher rainfall
periods would be injected into the aquifer space to reduce water
loss to evaporation and to build up a reserve for drier years
(Lafforgue, 2016).
Nonconventional sources of water has gained the CoW world
recognition as a pioneer in closing the water cycle by adopting
direct potable reuse (DPR) at an early stage. Born out of
Windhoek’s water emergency in the late 1950’s, the Goreangab
Water Reclamation Plant was introduced into the water supply
system in 1968 with a starting capacity of 4,800 m3/day. The
objective was to reclaim potable water directly from domestic
sewage effluent to augment conventional sources.
After the drought of 1996–1997, in the absence of feasible
medium-term supply alternatives, the CoW expanded capacity
and built a new DPR facility. The New Goreangab Water
Reclamation Plant was commissioned in 2002 with a capacity
of 21,000 m3/day (Lahnsteiner and Lempert, 2007; Lafforgue,
2016). The continued success of DPR in the city hinges on its
public health track record, with no DPR-related health problems
recorded to date, as well as its economic viability. Thanks to
a direct “pipe-to-pipe” approach, no environmental buffer is
needed to store the reclaimed water, reducing the cost of the
conveyance and blending of the purified water with other potable
sources (Lahnsteiner et al., 2018). Building on this success, the
city’s dual reticulation system supplies about 2 Mm3/year of
semipurified irrigation water from the old reclamation facility
to meet the needs of the city’s parks and public greenery (Van
Der Merwe et al., 2013). Reducing the demand for potable water
ensures that the primary water sources can be used solely to
provide potable water to the domestic consumers in Windhoek
(Van Rensburg, 2016).
METHODOLOGY
This paper presents a perspective of the institutional responses
during the peak of the drought in Windhoek in 2015–2017.
However, as mentioned earlier, one could say that the drought
started in late 2012. Before the onset of the drought, the last time
average rainfall was received in Windhoek was the 2011–2012
rainy season. From then on, rainfall and runoff were far below
the historical average, until late in the 2016–2017 season, when
relief finally arrived.
The analysis that informs this perspective is qualitative in
nature. It includes review and analysis of academic and policy
literature, as well as news articles, to understand the significance
of drought events in Namibia, in general, and in Windhoek, in
particular, as well as the measures taken by the CoW during
the 2015–2017 period of the drought. The analyses on the
overall government response, the challenges faced, and the
lessons learned are based on the first-hand knowledge and
experience of the first author, who formed part of the response





Leaning heavily on alternative sources of drinking water, such
as managed aquifer recharge and potable reclamation, proved
to be key to the CoW’s survival of the 2015–2017 drought.
Following previous poor rainy seasons and only 197mm of
rain in 2015 (against a long-term annual average of 360mm),
at the end of 2015, the Central Area Forecasting Model (CA-
Model) predicted that the water supply from the surface dams
would fail by the end of August 20162. With surface water being
rapidly depleted, NamWater began pumping groundwater from
the Northern aquifers, about 450 km away, to the overall supply
system for the Central Area and CoW (Die Republikein, 2015;
Lewis et al., 2019). Given the state of readiness and their smaller
implementation requirements, groundwater reserves and DPR
presented themselves as the most feasible alternatives, and the
CoW committed itself to finding ways to immediately increase
transfers from these water sources. This was primarily done
by rapidly financing and implementing emergency abstraction
from the Windhoek Aquifer in line with the Windhoek Managed
Aquifer Recharge Scheme (Murray et al., 2018), which had been
proposed in the early 2000’s but not yet implemented.
As part of the Water Crisis Management Strategy, the
emergency abstraction entailed the drilling of 12 additional large-
diameter boreholes, up to 500m deep (Murray et al., 2018; Scott
et al., 2018), at an approximate cost of N$160million (∼USD 10.7
million)3. The finalization and coming on line of the project were
timed to coincide with the now extended “run-dry” date of the
surface water dams (Institute for Public Policy Research, 2017).
Concurrently, measures were put in place to increase production
from the DPR facility from around 4.2 Mm3/year at the start of
2015 to around 5.75 Mm3/year, which, during the most critical
periods of 2016, represented about 30% of the overall supply
to Windhoek.
From the demand-side perspective, the newly established 2015
Drought Response Plan (City of Windhoek, 2015) provided
guidelines for responding to the emergency situation. They
were designed to maintain the health, safety, and economic
vitality of the community; to avoid adverse impacts on public
activity and quality of life for the community; and to consider
individual customer needs as much as possible. The document
2NamWater’s CA-Model is a computermodel that simulates the hydrological water
balance of the Central Area of Namibia on a monthly scale. “The CA-model
performs statistical analysis to quantify the security of water supply in terms of
statistical probabilities and can also be used to predict the earliest run-dry date
given current water storage volumes and no future inflows into the dam (worst
case scenario)” (NamWater, 2019).
3One Namibian dollar equals USD 0.067.
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was structured to identify drought severity indicators and link
them to drought response actions and program elements.
Regarding these actions, and regardless of the state of
readiness, in semiarid regions with consistent patterns of
recurring droughts, droughts should not be considered as
disasters that warrant a crisis response. Instead, they should
be seen as part of a region’s condition, posing risks that can
be managed with proactive policy approaches and a general
preparedness for such events. In this regard, the CoW deserves
commendation for putting in place options to augment its water
supply long before the onset of the 2015–2017 drought. However,
the eventual crisis response was based on planning done more
than a decade before, meaning that the CoW were fortunate to
have suitable alternatives when they were urgently needed. Often,
this is not the case, leading to forced decisions, which, although
they may provide short-term relief, may also be very costly and
with undesirable environmental impacts. In the case of the City
of Windhoek, had the augmentation schemes been implemented
earlier, this would have undoubtedly provided much greater
resilience to the drought.
Thus, a crisis approach can not only unduly burden the
public but also threaten sustainability. Furthermore, hastily
chosen solutions are unlikely to consider broader aspects such
as resiliency to similar future events or the long-term effects of
climate change.
Further Drought Response Actions
In past endeavors, the CoW had notable examples of successful
water demand management (WDM). For example, a leak
detection program put in place in the late 1990’s to reduce water
losses resulted in an impressive distribution system efficiency
near 90% (Lafforgue and Lenouvel, 2015). In the same period,
WDM through public engagement reduced overall demand by
20% (CoW Operational Data—1994–1997). However, with the
onset of what turned out to be persistent dry conditions in
2012/2013, it appeared that much of the improvements in WDM
gained in the mid-1990’s had been lost. In fact, in a 2006 study
of various aspects of WDM in the CoW, assessments clustered
around “nothing done” or “not implemented,” with isolated
instances of “well-implemented” (Van Rensburg, 2016).
Most notable is the observation of a “neglectful attitude”
among CoW WDM personnel: they did not seem concerned
about the lack of adherence to WDM policies when sufficient
water was available. In retrospect, the structure of the measures
introduced during the 1996–1997 drought were not really
sufficient to sustain “water-conscious” behavior beyond the end
of that crisis, which impacted public response the next time these
were needed. Therefore, as soon as the crisis passed, everyone,
including the public officials who were meant to continuously
drive the initiatives, resumed their past behavior. Thus, poor
enforcement of WDM policies during times of sufficient water
may allow the public to become accustomed to irresponsible and
wasteful consumption patterns. Consumers would then need to
readapt from scratch each time water becomes less available (Van
Rensburg, 2016).
Within this framework of previous poor enforcement of
WDM policies, the following are actual drought response actions
that focused on the domestic and nondomestic sectors pursued
during the drought of 2015–2017.
Domestic Sector
Communication with the public regarding water savings did not
start in 2015. Due to the earlier onset of the drought as a result
of the failed 2012–2013 rainy season, already in 2014, the CoW
and NamWater started to urge residents to reduce their water
consumption by at least 10%. However, despite this persistent
communication, in 2015, the overall drop in consumption (year
on year) was only 6%. As the drought intensified, the call for
savings was increased to 20% in 2015 and became a mandatory
30% in 2016. This was in addition to firming up the price
disincentive by introducing, in 2016, a structure whereby the
allocation to each household during Severe Water Scarcity
(Category E in the Drought Response Plan) dropped to 30
m3/month, with the tariff doubling for use up to 40 m3/month
and then quadrupling above 40 m3/month (Die Republikein,
2016). Consumption of more than 40 m3/month also risked
termination of supply, a penalty of N$2000 (∼USD130), and
a formal written warning before reconnection (Lewis et al.,
2019). After about 3800 households whose water consumption
exceeded 40m3 were identified, a task teamwas formed to engage
them (Schnegg and Bollig, 2016). “Chronic high consumers,”
or customers who regularly exceeded the 40 m3 limit, were
asked, in writing, to limit their water use and required to visit
the city administration offices to explain their water bills and
receive advice from officials on identifying and fixing possible
leaks (Institute for Public Policy Research, 2017). Those who
did not respond to these warnings within a certain period could
then have their water disconnected and be fined for repeat
transgressions (New Era, 2016).
Table 1 shows the changes in the tariff structure that
were implemented during the drought. As one of the goals
of public engagement was to inform consumers and obtain
cooperation, rather than to penalize violators, different public
engagement strategies were also put in place to garner support for
water savings. For example, the #DontWashMeNAM campaign
(Figure 3) aimed to create awareness through encouraging
people to stop washing their cars (informal carwash businesses
hampered demand management), an important social status
symbol in Namibian society. Using art created from the dirt on
unwashed windscreens, the campaign was hugely successful and
well-received by the general public (The Namibian, 2016b).
Various other platforms were also adopted to engage and
address the community. For example, information on the
severity of the drought and on water-saving techniques was
displayed in communal gathering places such as markets;
drought monitors were used to distribute educational material
and answer questions about the drought; and a dedicated CoW
hotline, website and social media platforms were set up to allow
customers to report water wastage (Die Republikein, 2015).
The effect of all the combined measures introduced at the
end of 2015, when the Windhoek Drought Response Plan was
unveiled, was an annualized saving of 25% in 2016 until the end
of the drought (Figure 4).
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TABLE 1 | List of the tariff structure changes implemented during the drought as part of water demand management (WDM) initiatives.
Tariffs before the 2015–2017 drought (2014) New tariffs defined under the 2015 Drought
Management Plan
Further amendment in the 2017 Water
Management Plan
0–0.2 kl/day (0–6 kl/month) N$12.60 0–0.2 kl/day (0–6 kl/month) N$17.77 0–0.2 kl/day (0–6 kl/month) N$19.25
0.201–1.5 kl/day (6–45 kl/month) N$20.93 0.201–1 kl/day (6–30 kl/month) N$26.47 0.201–0.73 kl/day (6–22 kl/month) N$29.91
More than 1.5 kl/day (45 kl/month) N$38.59 1.01–1.33 kl/day (30–40 kl/month) N$48.82 0.731–1 kl/day (22–30 kl/month) N$55.17
More than 1.33 kl/day (40 kl/month) N$112.50 More than 1 kl/day (30 kl/month) N$127.13
Source: City of Windhoek, http://www.windhoekcc.org.na/info_tariffs.php; City of Windhoek (2015, 2017b).
FIGURE 3 | #DontWashMeNAM campaign.
Despite their eventual success, the impact of these measures
had an unacceptably long lead time, and the actual savings
achieved during the whole drought period from 2015 to 2017
were only 15% or less, despite much higher targets. It is also clear
that the campaign only achieved real momentum in the latter
parts of the drought, and the missed opportunities early on could
have had dire consequences had the drought continued beyond
the start of 2017.
Furthermore, although public engagement and awareness
raising was part of the CoW’s strategy to reduce domestic water
consumption, the overall communication strategies were, at
times, inadequate and not robust enough. For example, despite
the announcement that a large-scale awareness campaign would
be implemented by the central government to inform residents
of the crisis and urge them to reduce water consumption,
the campaign was never formally launched, and materials
such as posters and stickers were not formally distributed.
Instead, communication was left to individual public institutions,
which often produced small-scale, uncoordinated, and poorly
conceptualized public education efforts. The effectiveness of
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FIGURE 4 | Periodic water demand management successes in Windhoek (CoW Operational Data).
public engagement strategies was further hampered by the mixed
and conflicting messages from the authorities. For instance,
in September 2016, as the drought intensified, the CEO of
NamWater claimed that theWindhoek aquifer had enough water
to supply the city for 10–13 years. But a few weeks later, the CoW
said that the reserve could last nomore than 2 or 3 years (Institute
for Public Policy Research, 2017).
Not directly under the control of the public authorities, but
equally important, was the inaccurate and unverified reporting
in the media. For example, after an announcement in April 2017
that restrictions on water use would be maintained (despite an
increase in dam levels during the rainy season) because residents
were still using more water than could be supplied sustainably
(The Namibian, 2017), the CoW declared inMay of that year that
the water restrictions would be relaxed on June 1, 2017 (City of
Windhoek, 2017b). Although the action by the CoWwas correct,
and in line with their then recently released Water Management
Plan (City of Windhoek, 2017a), the conflicting messages in the
media caused confusion in the public, which at that time was
hyper-alert to water issues, and impeded consumer confidence
in the public authorities. A consistent, uniform message from
all stakeholders that aligns with the public perception of reality
is critical to any successful WDM campaign, and this includes
managing the media.
Engaging Industries and Public Institutions
Involving consumer sectors across the board can foster a sense of
legitimacy and collaboration in saving water and increase support
for drought response strategies (Turner et al., 2016). Hence,
during the 2015–2017 Windhoek drought, targeted water-saving
initiatives were also extended to various highly water-consuming
industries. As 10% of the CoW’s water supply was used by
water-intensive industries at that time, and as these customers
generally have effective control over consumption, the CoW was
quick to engage them to help maximize water efficiency in their
production processes (Institute for Public Policy Research, 2017).
For example, Namibia Breweries, the largest industrial water
user in Windhoek, initiated several projects to reduce their
water consumption and augment internal supply, including
the drilling of boreholes in a saline aquifer to secure more
of their own supply and reclaim water in their brewing and
packaging plants to reduce overall consumption in line with
the 30% target (LCE in joint Venture with SCE Consulting
Engineers, 2019; Namibia Breweries Limited, n.d.). Namibia
Dairies improved their water-use efficiency, reducing the water
required to produce 1 L of product from 3.5 to 2.6 L. Measures
included additional flow meters that are monitored and noted
on a daily basis, water-saving devices throughout the plant and
ablution facilities, and various buffer tanks, pumps, and pipes to
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accumulate and redistribute the water (The Namibian, 2016c).
The Meatco Windhoek abattoir attempted to go beyond the
CoW’s water-saving target of 30%, setting its own target of 50%
(Meatco Namibia, 2016). Coca-Cola temporarily closed two of
their production lines in Windhoek, stopping the production of
returnable glass products and all can products, while making
a commitment not to adjust prices in the short term (The
Namibian, 2016a).
In general, the engagement with industries had a good degree
of success. This was fostered by close cooperation between the
CoW and industries, with the CoW committing to minimize
the financial and economic impact of water-saving measures.
However, reducing water use in a few specific sectors, namely,
construction and car washing, was more challenging.
Finding a middle ground between the short-term need to
sustain livelihoods and the long-term need to ensure a sustainable
water supply for the CoW proved difficult, with proposed actions
often met with much resistance and complaints from business
owners and their employees. For example, while restrictions
could be placed on the washing of cars in residential settings, it
was hard to limit people’s access to illegal carwash businesses,
especially in the informal areas. Attempts by the CoW to fine
and shut down businesses that failed to comply with the laws
on business water connections and use were strongly resisted,
and there were over 300 such operations in the city (Institute for
Public Policy Research, 2017).
Although the Windhoek Drought Response Plan
recommended that businesses delay construction until more
water was available (City of Windhoek, 2015), this guidance
also met strong resistance from the Construction Industry
Federation, among other groups. The federation said that
about 40,000 direct jobs and up to 400,000 dependents could
be affected if companies stopped construction (The Guardian,
2016). Given the city’s position as the economic center of the
country and its high urbanization rate, any business closure or
layoffs in Windhoek could reduce future investment prospects
(Pendleton et al., 2014; Institute for Public Policy Research, 2017;
Scott et al., 2018). Therefore, although this idea was already
embedded in the CoW Drought Management Plan of 2015, it
was not effectively implemented by that sector, as it was deemed
of national economic necessity to ensure the viability of the
construction businesses in Windhoek. The guide to water users
under various levels of supply scarcity related to the WDM
Response Index (WDMRI) (City of Windhoek, 2019) can be
found in the Supplementary Material.
Even though the CoW and NamWater applied a variety of
coordinated approaches to target a wide range of stakeholders,
there were missed opportunities to implement best practice
citizen and institutional engagement processes to encourage
all-round involvement and support for the drought response
strategies. In August 2016, through the Cabinet, the Ministry of
Agriculture, Water, and Forestry (MAWF) formed a committee
and instructed all public institutions to appoint two “water
marshals” from their staff. They would hold the 2-year
responsibility of educating all users on responsible water use,
conducting regular water-meter readings and basic maintenance,
and identifying and reporting leaks to the utilities, as well
as providing broad support to the water-saving campaign
(Scott et al., 2018).
This initiative, however, had limited effectiveness, as it
was difficult to ensure that public institutions complied with
the water-saving measures. Despite 55 water marshals being
identified by the end of 2016 and receiving basic water
management training, cuts in the government budget meant
reduced management support and an overall lack of motivation
for individuals to ensure implementation of the initiative. The
budget cuts also reduced resource availability and made it
difficult for public institutions to develop and build capacity
to carry out necessary maintenance in cases where technical
capacity was lacking, especially since they were expected to
use in-house maintenance budgets for the required repairs
(Save Water Namibia, 2018). Furthermore, for certain public
institutions, such as schools and hospitals, disconnecting their
water for breaching of rules or failure to pay their bills was
difficult (Institute for Public Policy Research, 2017). This failure
to effectively manage public institutions as part of the WDM
strategy highlights the critical need for government at all levels to
be involved in the process. Management processes by the CoW
were often ignored or overruled by institutions that answered to
government ministries, which were seen by many as authorities
with greater standing. Despite valiant effort, the CoW could not
manage to get buy-in from some ministries to ensure top–down
support for its initiatives.
Government’s Responses and Decision
Making
As mentioned earlier, effective drought responses do not
result from the mere understanding of the event. While
resources should be invested in improving the accuracy of
drought monitoring and early warning systems, equal or greater
attention has to be paid to the improvement of drought
governance structure to ensure a more effective division of
responsibilities between the national and local governments.
In the uncoordinated and delayed response of the national
government, the Windhoek drought exposed the limitations
inherent in the lack of decentralization in the country. As in
many Southern African cities where the national government
retains decision-making power (Makara, 2018), there was
confusion over the responsibility of the various stakeholders in
drought response.
A Drought Response Committee was formed by the CoW
already in 2015 to monitor drought conditions and assess the
effectiveness of the various strategies in the Windhoek Drought
Response Plan (City of Windhoek, 2015; Scott et al., 2018).
However, it was more effective in theory than practice, as
there was uncertainty with respect to the authority of the
committee, the reporting structure, and whether it was only
an internal CoW committee or other stakeholders could be
included (Institute for Public Policy Research, 2017). Although it
guided some critical early management strategies to reduce water
consumption and prepare emergency projects, the uncertainty
around the management of the committee and the participation
of external stakeholders limited real progress. The main problem,
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which proved to be crucial, was that the initial committee was
only represented by the CoW and did not include the other two
main stakeholders: NamWater and MAWF.
It was not until mid-2016 when a briefing to the State
President resulted in the formation of a Cabinet Committee
on Water Supply Security (CCWSS), supported by a Technical
Committee of Experts (TCE), consolidating the three critical
institutional stakeholders, namely, MAWF, NamWater, and the
CoW. The CCWSS/TCE immediately went to work, and building
on work already done at that stage by the CoW, a three-
phase emergency plan was put in place to devote attention and
resources to the immediate crisis in Windhoek and the future
water needs of the area (City of Windhoek, 2018; Scott et al.,
2018).
Phase 1 revolved around short-term interventions and
emergency projects over a period of 18 months to address
the precarious water supply situation in Windhoek (Namibian
Sun, 2016). This included the development of new municipal
boreholes, the piping of water from the karst aquifers at Kombat
and Berg Aukas to the Omatako Dam, groundwater sourcing
around Karibib, and the installation of special floating pump
stations to extract the remaining water from the Swakoppoort
and Von Bach Dams. Phase 2 evaluated proposed measures
for water security in the Central Area for the medium term
(Scott et al., 2018). Phase 3 comes into the picture by looking
at the region’s and the country’s future and long-term water
requirements to ensure greater security and resilience to droughts
in the long term. Despite initial difficulties with funding and the
structure of the CCWSS/TCE, Phase 1 has since been completed,
Phase 2 is well underway, and initial planning has started
on Phase 3. This intervention was critical to the survival of
Windhoek during the 2015–2017 drought, as well as the country’s
overall readiness for future similar events (World Meteorological
Organization, 2016).
CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED
The following section outlines the most important challenges
faced during the 2015–2017 drought as well as lessons learned.
As mentioned earlier, these reflections are based on the first-hand
knowledge and experience of the first author, who formed part
of the response at the time and worked with representatives of
public and private sector groups.
Climate Change and Climate Risks
Impacts of climate change and associated risks have been
acknowledged by governments in Southern Africa. In the case
of Namibia, the National Policy on Climate Change (Ministry
of Environment and Tourism, 2010) discusses the importance
of long-term planning, institutional arrangements that would be
necessary for policy implementation, resource mobilization, and
roles and responsibilities of the different stakeholders (public and
private sectors, civil society and nongovernmental organizations,
and faith and community-based organizations). However, as it
is the case with most of the countries in the developing world,
main limitations for implementation of plans and policies in all
sectors are, among many others, lack of institutional capacity
and resource mobilization. Additionally, long-term plans have
to be updated regularly to reflect new climatic, socioeconomic,
and environmental developments in these countries, as well as
advances in the state of knowledge and technology. At present,
very few countries have managed to establish such long-term
plans, including the necessary budgetary considerations for
proper implementation.
Specific to Namibia, climate change considerations at
governmental level have very much moved to the background
since the establishment of the (Ministry of Environment and
Tourism, 2010) and rarely feature in discussions centered around
the long-term planning of relevant infrastructure or development
strategies. In spite of the critical importance, it could be
speculated that issues of a more pressing nature on a day-to-
day basis is the primary reason for climate change enjoying a
diminished importance in the country.
However, and certainly not unique to Namibia, the
unpredictability of the impacts of climate change poses a
major challenge for planning purposes. Engineering water
supply solutions can no longer depend on steady historical data
when unprecedented climate phenomena are happening with
frightening intensity or frequency. This raises questions of the
usefulness of long-term strategic master planning, which has
traditionally been the backbone of infrastructure development,
including in the water sector. A new reality is surely setting in,
and preparedness is urgently needed. The diversified supply
developed for Windhoek in response to the drought was crucial
in avoiding a main disaster, and it shows the value of water
supply systems with sufficient redundancy to span multiyear
droughts and where individual elements can counter the possible
impact of climate change on a particular portion of the supply.
In this regard, the planning developed for the Central Area
of Namibia hinges on a multipronged approach, using surface
water and groundwater, for resilience to direct climate factors.
Governance
Proper cooperation between the responsible government
agencies is crucial to effectively tackle any crisis. In this case,
poor or nonexistent intergovernmental relationships played
a significant role in the poor initial response to the looming
crisis. At that time, the various actors had a history of mutual
mistrust, and, in some instances, their representatives did not
clearly understand their respective roles and responsibilities.
Even after the crisis was recognized, some preferred to ignore
the problem rather than admit to any failure on their part,
which, for the primarily government entities, might have had
political implications and also affected community trust in
government structures.
However, in mid-2016, there was swift progress through
the establishment of the Cabinet Committee on Water Supply
Security. The supporting Technical Committee of Experts was
made up of representatives of the National Department of Water
Affairs, the bulk supplier (NamWater) and the CoW. This created
the ideal opportunity for the various stakeholders to actively
integrate and coordinate planning and implementation in the
water sector, enabling not only faster implementation but also
better allocation of resources. This initiative not only worked
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well during the crisis but has been sustained since the drought,
fostering the hope that it will help to resolve future problems with
timely implementation of the necessary projects.
Response Plan
As the drought began, it became clear that none of the primary
responsible entities had prepared a response strategy. The region
had faced similar events in the past, but the responses had been
short lived, and documentation was poor or nonexistent. The
CoW responded well, but drafting a coordination document and
gaining the necessary authorization used up valuable time when
it could least be afforded. In addition, the document, being from
a single entity, was poorly received at first by other stakeholders
jointly responsible for water supply and management.
Slow or Delayed Project Implementation
One of the biggest challenges, and one that arguably exacerbated
the crisis, was the responsible authorities’ failure to timely
implement the necessary augmentation infrastructure. A 2004
NamWater study predicted that, by 2013, the water demand
in the Central Area of Namibia would exceed the supply
(NamWater, 2004). With the onset of the drought in 2015, the
area was consuming ∼10% more than the long-term yield of
available sources. The eventual failure of surface water sources
(around 75% of supply), triggered by the persistent drought, was
accelerated by the overabstraction of available sources, hence
worsening the impact of the drought during this critical time.
Ongoing Water Resources Management
With increasing pressure on water supply globally, along with
uncertainties around the impacts of climate change, no water
supply authority should be without specific management tools,
which are well-documented and known by all stakeholders. The
value of the original Drought Response Plan (put forward by
the CoW in 2015) in coordinating WDM efforts and dispersing
vital information on residents’ expected contributions cannot
be overstated. After the end of the drought in 2017, and
following the realization that demand management is not a
“switch on/switch off” tool, the plan was adapted to include the
necessary linkages to the supply sources; it was adjusted again in




Although industry collectively represents only 10% of demand,
engaging primary industrial consumers was hugely successful.
Not only was the response rapid, but the focus on water
consumption established water monitoring and management as
standard business processes, leading to efficiency gains that will
persist for the long term. Due to the uncertainty around the
expected duration of the crisis and its possible recurrence, many
industrial consumers preferred to focus on private augmentation,
which was facilitated through special supply arrangements. At the
same time, the prevailing social inequality in the city was clearly
visible in the push-back from certain business sectors. Given the
potential economic impact on low-earning residents, initiatives
to curb water use in construction and the many informal carwash
businesses were not successful, and the negative publicity around
these projects undermined the overall objective of soliciting
public cooperation.
Residential Water Demand Management
The loss of the gains in terms of water demand management
and public awareness/participation made during the 1996–1997
drought can be blamed for the slow initial response of residential
consumers to the new savings targets. Great initiatives were
established during that previous drought, but then, they were
abandoned for almost two decades. Had that awareness and
those practices been maintained, a much stronger and prompter
response to the demand management initiatives could have been
expected. Even after a response was finally established, other
challenges cropped up, such as the market drive toward the
installation of gray water systems, which undercut the CoW’s
initiative to harvest wastewater for DPR supplementation.
Communication to Bring the Citizens on
Board
Effectively reaching the public requires a careful balance
between technical and political voices, but messages should
include the right degree of technical information to enhance
the public understanding of the drought. In the case of the
2015–2017 drought, efforts to communicate the severity of
the drought were hampered by the inability of the various
government organizations to find effective ways to engage the
public. Along with the inconsistency of the messages from the
various institutions, this can be considered one of the biggest
failures during the drought. The fragmented and conflicting
messages, along with inaccurate media reporting, inevitably led
to the public questioning the credibility of information and
transparency in general. Later on, the correct type of data and
comprehensive explanations of the various aspects related to
the crisis were key in supporting public perceptions. Citizens
were more responsive when they had a clear understanding of
the nature of the problem and how they could contribute to
the solution.
In 2016, water savings of up to 30% (compared to previous
consumption) helped extend the run-dry date of the surface
water storage far enough, allowing time for alternative supply
strategies to be implemented. This can be attributed to a
careful “bundling” of price disincentives with restrictive targets,
implemented in late 2015 and maintained through the end of
the drought. This strategy, together with better communication
and the distribution of critical information, helped combat the
once-prevailing mentality of “as long as I can pay for it, I can
have as much water as I want.” Water demand management
remains one of the best tools for tackling an urban water crisis,
and communication is an essential part of it.
FINAL THOUGHTS
Although the CoW deserves recognition for its proactive stance
through the years in securing nonconventional water sources
such as the Windhoek Managed Aquifer Recharge Scheme and
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DPR and for taking an early lead in responding to the drought,
there should also be mechanisms to assess and quantify the cost
of delayed action or inaction (Verbist et al., 2016). There is
widespread criticism of the national government, the CoW, and
the national utility provider for being unsupportive and passive
in putting forth measures to timely address the impacts of the
droughts. In this regard, the 2015–2017 Windhoek drought was
an important lesson in the importance of government policies
and decisions at the various levels being aligned, integrated,
and consolidated in national drought responses rather than
individual and uncoordinated efforts. Due to the lack of these
elements, initial cooperation was critically lacking and resulted
in delayed action, which was detrimental to the overall response
and could have had more serious consequences.
A shift from reactive to proactive approaches does not happen
overnight. One important lesson learned by the CoW is reflected
in its Water Management Plan, released after the 2015–2017
drought. A substantial revision of the 2015 Drought Response
Plan (V1/2015) was the Water Management Plan first released
in 2017 (City of Windhoek, 2017a) and then in 2019 (City of
Windhoek, 2019), which adopted a more holistic approach to
WDM as an ongoing initiative instead of an emergency fallback
for times of drought (LCE in joint Venture with SCE Consulting
Engineers, 2019). The plan is based on scarcity severity indicators
from NamWater’s demand/supply modeling, using the Central
Area Forecasting Model and monitoring indices, aligning the
CoW’s WDM response with NamWater’s supply forecast on an
annual basis. At the core of it is an attempt to match supply and
demand on an annual basis and in the process provide constant
feedback to the public on the status of water supply affecting
their consumption.
As mentioned, people are more likely to save water if they
understand the reasons for doing so and are constantly kept
informed. This lesson from the 2015–2017 drought were very
useful after the failed 2018–2019 rainy season (the second
driest in over 100 years of record keeping) prompted renewed
intensification of demand management. This time around, the
response was immediate and the news much better received.
Finally, the story of the 2015–2017 Windhoek drought shows
that feasible and effective solutions are context specific. What
is common practice elsewhere could be less common on the
African continent and perhaps even less in Southern Africa. Yet,
the challenges are the same, if not bigger, in an environment
where it may not be so easy to find readily available solutions
and or a well-integrated response. Thus, the lessons learned
here might be considered “ordinary” or “old news” by someone
in the developed world, but they are still very relevant in
Southern Africa and need to be advocated and supported to bring
preparedness to the region as climate change looms.
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